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1 Introduction
In Malawi, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the
under-provision of basic public goods is a key
factor in the persistence of widespread poverty,
while public goods provision is strongly related to
patterns of local governance. But exactly which
local governance institutions are associated with
better or worse provision? This article explores
that question, drawing on material gathered in
2009 from urban sites in the north (Rumphi),
centre (Kasungu) and south (Ndirande township,
Blantyre) of the country. Public goods provision
was scrutinised in four fields: safe birthing
(reducing rates of maternal mortality), security
and public order, water and sanitation, and the
enterprise environment and markets. Although
information was gathered on provision from the
pre-colonial period forward, here the focus is on
how public goods were supplied during the three
regimes of H. Kamuzu Banda, Bakili Muluzi and
Bingu wa Mutharika. Proximate determinants of
the adequacy of provision were identified and
tested as the fieldwork progressed. These are:
z The strength of the sanctions regime
z The presence or absence of cohesive
communities capable of sustaining collective
action
z The extent to which the relevant actors and
agencies coordinate their activities.
Taken together, these explain a good deal about
why public goods are adequately provided in
some areas and periods and not others.
This article discusses the three causal variables
briefly before providing examples of how they
have influenced the provision of the various
public goods over time and place. It is shown that
the nature of the state and politics in each period
had an impact on how these variables were
structured and operated, and thus on the
provision of public goods in the four fields.
2 Proximate determinants of the provision of
public goods
Initial analysis of the data collected during the
fieldwork suggested that certain institutional
configurations were associated with better public
goods delivery. Further analysis showed that these
configurations are related to the nature of
governance – specifically, how various local leaders
interact with, rule and motivate their people. The
nature of local governance is in turn influenced by
the regime in power centrally. For example
chieftaincy became more or less prominent, local
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assemblies’ powers waxed and waned, and party
officials’ actions changed over time as the
authoritarian H. Kamuzu Banda regime
(1965–94) gave way, following the democratic
transition, to the governments of Bakili Muluzi
(1994–2004) and Bingu wa Mutharika
(2004–present). We begin by discussing the three
proximate determinants that seem to affect the
delivery of public goods at local level.
2.1 The strength of the sanctions regime
When rules, norms and regulations are clearly
delineated and enforced, whether by state officials,
community leaders or traditional authorities,
public goods are more likely to be adequately
created and distributed. A lack of sanctions –
where commands and rules are not backed by
credible threats and punishments – permits
individuals and groups to behave in ways that are
not socially responsible. Some sanctions are more
subtle than others. For instance, enforcement may
include imprisoning or ostracising rule breakers.
But just as effective is instilling beliefs and
standards – norms of behaviour – so that
individuals and groups wish to comply.
2.2 The presence of cohesive groups capable of
sustaining collective action
The presence of a cohesive community, however
rooted, facilitates – but does not guarantee – the
voluntary collective action which is critical to the
provision of some public goods. Groups are
formed in various ways – through shared
identities, common experiences, collective
ideologies and beliefs, etc. Some are deliberately
created while others emerge organically.
Members tend to share trust (at least within
limits), methods of working and goals. Economic
development is fostered by individuals and
groups who can initially draw on the benefits of
close community membership, while acquiring
the skills and resources to participate in wider
networks beyond community level at a later date.
In other words, bonding can be a defensive
mechanism to reduce risk and uncertainty and to
provide protection, whereas bridging between
small groups is more proactive and generates
linkages that offer new opportunities (Woolcock
and Narayan 2000; Easterly et al. 2006).
2.3 The coordination of activities horizontally across
jurisdictions
The delivery of public goods is, in part, dependent
on the horizontal collaboration, in an efficient
and sustained manner, of various key
administrators, leaders and agencies, especially
where there are jurisdictional overlaps or gaps.
To do effective development work, various actors
need to integrate their policies, divide the work,
coordinate their activities, combine funds, share
information, assess results in common, etc.
Problems arise when they do not; when agencies
operate in the same arena without coordination;
or when there are gaps between their
jurisdictions and people living in these are
ignored. The relevant agents are numerous and
include chiefs, city and state officials, supervisors
of parastatals, religious leaders, heads of
community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors.
3 The delivery of public goods
Data were collected using ethnographic methods
in three quite different urban settings1 over a
period of four months in 2009, and similar
research has continued in one location
(Ndirande) for a further ten months in 2010.
Here, only three cases are presented to illustrate
the richness of the material being collected and
the extent to which the three proximate
variables can begin to explain variances in the
delivery of public goods. Only a very basic
discussion of the three post-independent regimes
is provided, but it is sufficient to understand how
national and local governance impact upon these
institutional configurations and public goods
provision.
3.1 Crime and policing: Neighbourhood Watch and
the Kasungu police listening post
H. Kamuzu Banda’s government was notoriously
strict on rule enforcement. Where corruption,
disobedience or disrespect were found, they were
addressed by local Malawi Congress Party (MCP)
officials, including the Malawi Young Pioneers
(MYP) or the Malawi Youth League, working in
tandem with the police. Under Muluzi
(1994–2004), discipline became lax and popular
perception was that there was ‘too much
freedom’. Governance reforms contributed to
this, in that regulations barring detention
without trial, setting habeas corpus standards,
ensuring bail was granted within 48 hours of
arrest, and establishing a new court system were
part of the transition. Crime rose dramatically in
the Muluzi years as the MYP was disbanded, and
the police force did not grow sufficiently to take
up the slack. This resulted in delays in evidence
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gathering and court appearances, which when
combined with bail regulations meant that
suspects – even those caught red-handed – were
released by the police back into the communities
where they had committed crimes. Informants
also say that under Muluzi, people also came to
feel they could do what they wanted to promote
their self-interest, regardless of others, and that
it was not considered politically correct (or safe)
for neighbours to try to stop them.2
Quite soon after Mutharika came to power in
2004, people noticed a change. Malawians say
that the current regime is similar to Banda’s,
although less ‘oppressive’. Civil servants also
recognise the difference between the current and
former presidents: for instance, one senior
policeman in Kasungu told us: President
Mutharika is ‘serious’ and has set a new tone
within the police service (C and K, 17 August
2009, see Guide, below). In fact, before the 2009
election, we found people in the north calling
Mutharika ‘little Banda’ and joking that they
were ‘voting for the MCP’ when they actually
meant Mutharika’s DPP (Democratic
Progressive Party). A return to relative order is
welcomed by the bulk of the population after ten
years of deteriorating services and insecurity. But
what has been most surprising to researchers is
the willingness of citizens to give up some of the
freedoms acquired at the transition, especially
regarding detention and mobility.
One reform promoted by donors after the
democratic transition was improving security
through retraining the police, introducing
community policing and building security
infrastructure. This programme included the
formation of neighbourhood watch (NW)
committees, in which local leaders – generally
chiefs – were to establish a volunteer force to
guard their neighbourhoods at night. Without
sufficient equipment, training, wages or police
support, these NW units have repeatedly
dissolved and been revived to disband again. One
outcome of the NWs’ ongoing struggle against
repeat offenders was a decision – apparently
made by groups independently of one another –
to establish a curfew. The time at night when
this applies varies from place to place (10 pm
generally) and it refers only to pedestrians.
Citizens and NWs have also called for the police
to close bars before midnight as a method of
getting thieves off the street, but without the
same success.3 There has also been pressure on
the police to keep criminals in jail rather than
allowing them to go free on bail while evidence is
gathered and they await court hearings.4
Characteristic of the current regime’s emphasis
on reviving a rule-based regime is the Kasungu
Police Listening Unit, a joint effort of the police,
the town assembly and the market committee.5
The initiative was formally launched by the
town’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the
deputy police superintendent and the market
master in mid-September 2009. In his remarks at
the inaugural meeting, the CEO said that the
Town Assembly has by-laws from 1998 when local
government was formed, one of which is about
security:
We want now to tighten the security here at
the Kasungu bus depot and market premises.
We want to secure visitors here who travel
from different places. I want Kasungu to have
a clean record on security at the depot and
market. I want Kasungu town to be attractive
and disciplined. I want the police to get rid of
all robbers and thieves who steal things from
people travelling to various places. Let me
warn you – those who steal people’s assets – in
this depot, I am ordering the deputy police
superintendent that ‘if you catch a thief here,
please do not grant bail’. I repeat this, ‘do not
grant bail’. I want Kasungu boma to be free
from theft. What you should know is that
Kasungu boma is the home of former President
Dr H. Kamuzu Banda. So we must be
exemplary. To him peace and order always
[were important]… I urge you to tip the
Kasungu police on suspects so that we get rid
of all criminals… In 1994–2006 we had a lot of
criminal cases, so now we want to get rid of
these crimes. If you are caught, no bail shall
be given. I am not threatening you, but the
assembly shall not accept bail (A,
16 September 2009, see Guide, below).
The Deputy Superintendent of Police added that
‘we had a lot of challenges as far as security is
concerned’ at the market and depot but, ‘since
2005 we have been trying to confront these
problems and as Kasungu police, we promise to
work hand-in-hand with Kasungu Town
Assembly, to combat crime… Peace and order
will be good from now. Let me repeat what the
Chief Executive has said. He has ordered that
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once you are caught, no bail shall be granted. So
be careful, keep away from theft… We must
work hand-in-hand with the vendors and if you
know some of the suspects, tip the police’.
Slightly less effusive was the market master, who
thanked the authorities for using market
revenues well and for being accountable. At the
same time, though, he urged the police not just
to pick anybody anyhow. ‘You need to arrest
those [acting] against the law; criminals must be
arrested’. Finally he added, ‘I agree that police,
please, once a criminal is caught, do not grant
bail’ (A, 16 September 2009, see Guide, below).
This case provides evidence of both coordination
between various agencies to deliver public safety
and an emphasis on rule enforcement. A recent
visit to Kasungu indicates that the Unit is
functioning, and that the town officials are still
working with the market committee and the
police to ensure the bus station and nearby
market remain orderly (W, 30 June 2010, see
Guide, below).
3.2 Safe birthing, traditional birth attendants and
hospital deliveries
It took President Mutharika some time to sort
himself out politically, but one advantage he had
for consolidating his rule was the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief,
which increased government spending and
enabled the recruitment of more staff (training
of doctors and nurses, hiring of more health
surveillance assistants (HSAs) and the purchase
of equipment, etc.). That said, the building of
new infrastructure and the coordination of
government inputs do not seem to have kept
pace with the policy reforms. A combination of
new rules and an inability to implement them
has meant that while some changes have been
made, they are not enough to guarantee better
service delivery. Coordination of groups and
leaders to ensure delivery of goods remains weak
in some areas, as do community initiatives to
provide self-help. The example of efforts to
reduce the maternal mortality is provided here.
The reasons given for high rates of maternal
mortality (984/100,000)6 in Malawi are similar to
those given elsewhere in Africa. Doctors at
Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital (QECH) in
Blantyre listed these as: a lack of appropriate
care when heavy bleeding accompanies delivery;
eclampsia and hypertension; prolonged labour
and a ruptured uterus; septic abortions and
peritonitis; being left alone during labour; a lack
of transport to health facilities; a shortage of
staff on labour wards (resulting ‘in women giving
birth on their own, and in some cases babies may
fall from their beds leading to death’); incorrect
drug treatment; youthful childbearing;
HIV/AIDS complications; lack of blood supply;
and delivery by traditional birth attendants
(TBAs) and other untrained and ill-equipped
persons (M, 4 and 5 August 2009 and A,
16 October 2009, see Guide, below). The fact
that women are in danger during pregnancy and
childbirth has entered the language as a proverb:
Ali ndi pakati, meaning pregnant women are at a
crossroads between life and death (M, 3 August
2009, see Guide, below).
Traditional birth attendants
For years, Malawi sought to train and register its
TBAs, as they were frontline providers of
maternity care and represented an improvement
on delivery by unskilled female relatives in areas
under-served by doctors and midwives. Recently
a long-time trainer of TBAs explained their role
to us:
They were certified and registered with the
clinics in their areas. They would get all the
requirements they needed, which was called
‘delivery kit.’ It included gloves, papers,
basins, buckets, things to lay on the floor.
They were taught how to boil water for
delivery and the like. At the end of each
month there were supervisors to check up on
them. They would visit them anytime to see
what they were doing whether good or bad.
The aim was to see if they were following the
rules of hygiene to avoid diseases. The
supervisors, who would be either HSAs or
nurses directed by the clinic, would visit them
without notice. These TBAs had a very good
relationship with the hospital at large. They
were known by the ministry or the District
Health Officer (Z, 2 October 2010, see Guide,
below).
But in-keeping with international guidelines, in
mid-2009 the government changed its policy and
banned the use of TBAs. The state radio
broadcast this edict far and wide (NyasaTimes,
17 and 19 June 2009, see Guide, below). The ban
remained until late 2010.7 But during those 15 or
so months TBAs were being encouraged by
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hospital staff to send women to clinics to deliver,
though their ‘retraining’ was not implemented
everywhere. Even where it had been, all TBAs
had not stopped practising and we found active
TBAs in all three urban sites.8
But the decree did mean that more women were
coming to (already overburdened) clinics than
before, and that TBAs, who once received
equipment from health centres, were no longer
provided with delivery kits. Thus, TBAs
operating outside the health system were having
to use bare hands to deliver babies or to turn
breech babies around (M, 4, 10 and 11 August
2009, see Guide, below).
Hospital avoidance
Why do women use TBAs when a health centre is
nearby? In parts of Ndirande, many of the roads
are narrow, stony pathways which are impassable
to vehicles. Thus, an ambulance (if there was
one)9 or a car or minibus would not be able to
reach women in such high-density areas. In
Kasungu and Rumphi, where each district
hospital has an ambulance, distances are greater
and often women start labour and do not reach
the hospitals before delivering. But there are
other more socially rooted reasons why women
choose to deliver at home, despite the
government’s instructions otherwise.
Kasungu hospital appears well managed and
relatively clean, although even here there were
cases of women in the maternity ward sleeping
on the floor, under the beds of other women.
Overcrowding was reportedly due to the ban on
TBAs and encouragement to come to hospital
given by the media and HSAs in the surrounding
areas to pregnant women who might previously
have delivered nearer home. The Kasungu
district hospital’s maternity ward’s facilities were
the same as before the ban, and incapable of
receiving the additional intake. Therefore, those
awaiting labour – including women sent to the
hospital weeks ahead of delivery because
problems were foreseen or because due-dates
were uncertain – often stayed in the ‘guardian
shelter’,10 which was also inadequate. At
Ndirande clinic there is no guardian shelter, and
women who need special care were referred to
QECH, although they do not always end up there
because coordination between the two facilities is
not sufficient to ensure mothers follow clinicians’
orders.
Though encouraged to deliver in a clinic or
hospital and taught that home deliveries are
more dangerous, many women prefer to stay
away. In discussions with guardians and patients,
a number of reasons rooted in local beliefs and
perceptions were given for the preference for
home deliveries:
The nursing staff – especially trainees and
younger female nurses (as opposed to older,
more experienced nurses and male nurses) –
are ‘rude’ and ‘arrogant’, give preference to
their friends and richer women, chastise
women for not following rules and demand too
much of them. ‘A patient’s dignity is stripped
off and they become objects of abuse and
laughter’ (N, 13 September 2009, see Guide,
below).
Women in Kasungu hospital’s guardian
shelter told us that the HIV/AIDS test is
‘compulsory’ and the test ‘scares some
mothers to shun antenatal clinics. Some
mothers would commit suicide if they are told
[sic.] of their HIV+ status’. One HSA
admitted to us in Ndirande that the health
committee there deliberately does not tell
women beforehand about HIV testing at the
antenatal clinic so they are not deterred from
attending (N, 11 September 2009, see Guide,
below).
Some nurses reportedly ignore women’s needs
to the point of putting women and babies in
danger. Some women and a doctor told us of
cases where babies had been born without
assistance at the hospital, which had fallen
onto the floor because nurses were not
available to help. Others claim that some
medicines are withheld from them and given
to preferred patients.
Some women are afraid their pregnancies will
be ‘stolen’ if they go to hospital to wait to
deliver, i.e. they fear women there will use
witchcraft to remove their babies from the
womb.
Women want to avoid caesarean sections and
they fear that a delay during delivery at the
hospital will result in the operation being
performed. They argue that TBAs are more
patient with slow progress and allow women
to deliver normally.
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Women who have extra-marital sex while
pregnant – or who have husbands who have
multiple partners (inside a polygamous
marriage or outside their single marriage) –
fear that their pregnancies will be ‘tied’,
meaning that the birth canal will close and
they will not be able to deliver normally. To
counteract this they believe that they must
take herbs given by a traditional herbalist,
and this practice is not allowed in the hospital.
Instead, ‘tied’ pregnancies are treated by
caesarean section, so women who know or
suspect infidelity and expect this problem will
want to deliver elsewhere.11
Women fear that strangers in hospitals may
steal their newborn babies.
Women are also scared of using family planning
as they have heard that ‘there is no safe
method’. ‘Mothers therefore shun the hospital
[as they] fear that they will be persuaded to
take one of the contraceptive methods’ (N,
11 and 13 September 2009, see Guide, below).
Therefore, in spite of the government’s ban on
TBAs, additional funds provided to the Ministry of
Health, and new staff and some new construction
within the health service, many women who could
access maternity wards preferred to deliver at
home. The lack of enforcement was the result of
the unwillingness and inability of all state agencies
to enforce the ban,12 as well as some public
antipathy to hospital deliveries. HSAs were active
in raising public awareness of the safety of clinic or
hospital deliveries, and in places chiefs took part.
For instance, one of our team attended what might
be called an inquest held after the death of a
woman and baby during childbirth at home in peri-
urban Kasungu. Attending the community meeting
to explain why the woman died and to emphasise
the need for women to go to the hospital to deliver
were the chief, an HSA supervisor and the widower
(M, 24 August 2009, see Guide, below). Where
education rates are higher, as in Rumphi, maternal
mortality rates are significantly lower (382/100,000;
A, 16 October 2009, see Guide, below), which
suggests a likely element in the long-term
solution. This case shows how a well-intentioned
policy reform can fail because of failure to take
account of local beliefs and culture, and a lack of
coordination among the relevant agencies –
factors which could have been anticipated if there
had been greater foresight of consequences.
3.3 Market management and politics: the Ndirande
market
One of the most interesting aspects of public
goods provision in Malawi is the way that party
politics interferes with collective action, the
selection and effectiveness of leaders and inter-
agency coordination. While this is not the only
divisive factor undermining public goods
delivery,13 after the democratic transition in some
areas it became one of the most powerful. It is
certainly the case in Ndirande market but is also
in evidence elsewhere, for example Ndirande
water kiosk management and recently in
Kasungu market (W, 28 June 2010, see Guide,
below).
Ndirande market burnt to the ground in October
2008, seven months before the national
presidential and parliamentary elections. In
other markets, where there were fires in the
same period reconstruction efforts were handled
by vendors and local officials. But in Ndirande
rebuilding was politicised because Ndirande is
‘the political bedroom of the UDF’. The United
Democratic Front is a southern party, which in
2008 was led by former President Muluzi, a Yao
(when many vendors are also Yao) and a Blantyre
businessman. He was then running for president.
He came and gave a speech and donated
K2 million to the vendors to cover their losses
and start reconstruction. The leader of a second
political party gave K3 million. Each of the
vendors (whose wares had been destroyed in the
fire) reportedly received between K1,000–2,500
as a result. Local Indian businessmen also
pledged over K10 million and after that,
Mutharika promised K3 million to rebuild the
market. Reportedly, a committee based at
Blantyre assembly offices was responsible for
gathering and spending these funds. In
November 2008 vendors were called there to
receive money but were ‘told that their money
was only K3.5 million and that K800,000 had
been borrowed by their [the city’s] boss, who was
in Ghana for official duties at the time. This did
not go [down] well, and people started
protesting’. They marched back to Ndirande and
set fire to the DPP office near the clinic. ‘So the
President said, “no more money from the
government side”’. After that the other pledges
failed to materialise too. In the meantime the
Minister of Local Government had promised
publicly that the government would rebuild the
market, requiring some K160 million, and at
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year-end 2009 the first phase was nearing
completion (W, 25 July 2009; K and C,
31 October 2009, see Guide, below).
The impact of changes in party regimes on the
management of the Ndirande market has been
very significant. For 30 years under Banda, the
MCP was in power and no other parties were
allowed to form or to operate; moreover,
everyone was in theory a member of the MCP. In
Ndirande market there was an elected market
committee that represented vendors and an
individual committee member was voted to
represent their section (dried fish, fresh fish,
bananas, hardware, etc.). The committee’s role
was (and is) to handle disputes between vendors
within their sections, to represent their vendors
at market meetings, to relay information from
the market master to vendors, and to discipline
vendors who break section-level and market
rules. At the transition to multipartyism, market
politics become more complicated. A former
(MCP) market chairman explained:
that he lost his power soon after people voted
for a multi-party type of democracy through a
referendum and there was no respect for
market leaders due to too much freedom
campaigned [being advocated] by the
opposition parties during their campaign. The
UDF was announced the winner of the
general elections, and the party took charge of
the market and theft was on the increase
[ever] since then. The market had three party
committees: UDF, MCP, and AFORD
[Alliance for Democracy] but the UDF
committee had more powers. [For example]…
if a UDF member insulted an MCP member,
the MCP member was first reporting to the
MCP party chairman at the market who was
reporting to the UDF chairman as the in-
charge of the market and together they were
resolving the conflict in a balanced way (W, 27
July 2010, see Guide, below).
The difficult transfer of power from Muluzi to
Mutharika in 2004–05 – as the latter threw off
the UDF yoke and formed and populated the
DPP by luring politicians from other parties –
had ramifications in the Ndirande market. There
were ‘elections of a neutral committee in 2005’
our informant explained, ‘and Mr Zimuka was
elected into position but the DPP man, Mr
Bernard, started frustrating him and Mr Zimuka
just surrendered and stopped working as a
chairman’ (W, 27 July 2010, see Guide, below).
Because party-political tension continued in
national politics until 2009 when Mutharika and
the DPP won a landslide victory, Ndirande
market committee politics remained contentious
throughout the period. This affected how well
the committee represented the interests of
vendors and how successfully it helped local
government enforce market regulations.14
In 2008, a meeting between the President and
the market committees was held in Blantyre, and
the elected chairman of the market committee
went to attend. The situation as it unfolded was
explained to us this way:
The elected chair got the message and he
informed his Executive Committee members
about the issue. But the DPP party decided to
pick those who had positions in their party
and they went to see the President. A few days
later the elected chair heard that there was to
be a meeting at the Civic Centre and when he
went there with the whole committee, they
were surprised to hear that there was an order
from above that all the markets in Blantyre
should be led by people who are in the DPP
party and that the committee was replaced by
those who went to see the President (W,
22 July 2009, see Guide, below).
A deputy in the DPP affiliated committee
explained the situation differently: ‘[I was]
elected into this position at the time Dr Bingu
wa Mutharika was forming his party [2005] and
those who elected me were members of the DPP,
who are also traders in the market. The former
[UDF] committee doesn’t operate and they are
not involved anywhere since their party lost
power. They have also accepted that their powers
are gone’ (W, 28 July 2009, see Guide, below). In
his version, the old (UDF) committee is
effectively dissolved, although we know it still
exists and operates.
Crucially, the DPP market committee has the
backing of the city ‘assembly’. Blantyre city
officials admitted to us that they prefer working
with committees affiliated to the ruling party.15
This is not an unusual situation in Malawi: it is a
legacy of the Banda years when committees were
MCP-affiliated, and later, as Muluzi became
president, UDF loyalists felt justified in taking
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control of public works committees (e.g. water
kiosk committees in Ndirande). Muluzi actually
encouraged it by telling communities that
development would accrue only to UDF
supporters (Cammack 2000). Granting positions
of leadership to public goods committees at local
level that generated perks – not unlike
nominating senior politicians to cabinet or mid-
level supporters to parastatal boards – was one
way in which the UDF could reward and retain
loyalty. In 2005 when Mutharika consolidated
power in the DPP, the UDF members were
deposed by DPP supporters (also true of the
water kiosk committees in Ndirande). This
practice has gained some legitimacy: those who
support opposition parties seem resigned to
being displaced and not benefiting equally from
public goods, and so await the day their party is
in power and they can take control of public jobs,
committees and funds. This may be labelled ‘a
single party mentality in a multi-party context’.
It demonstrates again16 the belief that democracy
rewards all citizens equally, no matter who they
vote for or who is in power, is not yet entrenched
in Malawi.
Evidence gathered in 2009 in Ndirande market
suggests that most vendors preferred to work
with the old committee, not necessarily because
it was UDF affiliated but because it was elected
openly. The DPP committee was seen by many to
be imposed from above. The DPP committee was
weakened further when the chair gave up his
market bench and when a dispute arose about
who was his deputy. Now the situation is in flux,
as the need for a ‘neutral’ committee is
recognised by many in the market and some in
local government. A new election may be called.
In the meantime, the politicisation of the market
committees means that, first, the market master
– a city employee – has a fine line to walk
between what city officials perceive to be the
legitimate committee and what the vendors feel
is representative of their interests. Having clear
lines of authority in the market would make his
job easier. Second, while section leaders are able
to handle disputes and problems among their
own vendors, a strong market-wide committee is
needed to deal with wider issues – such as
demands to rebuild the market more quickly, to
construct flush toilets, to install more water taps,
to improve nearby roads, to deal more effectively
with insecurity, and to move stallholders on the
streets into the market.
4 Conclusion
These and other experiences demonstrate that
coordination between agencies and rule
enforcement is important to the delivery of
improved security, safe birthing and market
management. Undermining coordination are
jurisdictional overlaps and uncertainties, capacity
weaknesses, politicisation of public services, and
resource constraints. Policy shifts originating with
donors and major regime changes compound the
problem. Conflicting rules and norms emerge
during transformations, and if they are not
clarified and enforced (due to weak leadership)
this contributes to their not being obeyed or
wholeheartedly adopted by citizens. It is also
important to work with local beliefs and
perceptions, as the fate of the attempts to improve
maternal health services has shown. Citizens and
local leaders can join together, initiate self-help
and work with local and state officials to deliver
public goods (e.g. market committees, community
health committees, vendors’ savings clubs,
neighbourhood watches, etc.). But for various
historical reasons these initiatives are generally
small and weak, and rarely bridge one to another
or endure over long periods in Malawi.
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Notes
* This article draws on field research
undertaken by Edge Kanyongolo (K), James
Amani (A), Moir Walita Mkandawire (W),
Basileke Mwamlima (M), Joel Nkhonya (N),
Eveness Zuze (Z) and Diana Cammack (C).
Each researcher’s field notes are cited by their
initial and a date in the text, with a guide
provided below.
1 Ndirande, Malawi’s oldest township, is within
the city boundaries of Blantyre, although
parts of it are still under the authority of
traditional chiefs. Its population is largely
migrant and poor and notoriously politicised
and volatile. Kasungu is a relatively
prosperous market town in the central region,
and although attracting migrant tobacco
estate workers from all over Malawi, its main
population is Chewa. It has a town
government but also chiefs retain some
powers inside the urban area. Rumphi in the
north is a smaller market town, and the seat
of the district with the highest development
indicators in the country. It has a strong
Paramount chief (of the Tumbuka) who takes
an active role in local politics, as well as local
government officials.
2 One Malawian commentator explained the
change in attitudes this way: ‘There is no[t]
much zeal to work… because people have
taken democracy as a break from the pressure
they were having [from Banda] previously.
They were work[ing] for fear, but with the
coming of democracy they say “yeah let us now
relax; this is the time we have been looking
for”’ (AfDevInfo n.d.). Residents in the three
sites provided stories about how rules and
enforcement procedures were relaxed after the
transition, e.g. the lifting of a ban on the sale of
auto (spare) parts in open markets – forbidden
by Dr Banda (as an anti-theft measure); and
the relaxation of the requirement for dipping
cattle and inspecting animals for sale as the
state’s veterinary services weakened. Talking
about payment of business licence fees, a
Blantyre city official explained that since 1994
many regulations, including by-laws requiring
the payment of fees for business licences, have
not been enforced. ‘People’, he said, have done
‘things the way they want since multi-party’, so
they wonder why the city, asking for payment
now, is being so ‘hard’ on them (C, 31 October
2009, see Guide, below).
3 It is widely held that ‘thieves hide in bars up
to midnight then start stealing’ (A,
5 September 2009, see Guide, below). But
enforcing these laws is not easy, especially
against barkeepers, who, it is intimated, pay
bribes to assemblies to get licences that
permit late closing. ‘If the police was given
power to control these bars’, one Kasungu
resident noted, ‘it would have been better’. An
Ndirande resident concurred: ‘at Chinsewu
and Goliyo bars, people enjoy [drinking] up to
2 am… If police can patrol in bars I think the
crime can also end… If they can be closing at
22.00, we can be on the safer side’ (A,
5 August 2009, see Guide, below).
4 This is not a law, although the clerk at
Machinjiri magistrate court reminded us that
vagabondage is against the law and is
punishable by the police and courts. He said
that if a person is walking on the streets after,
say, 10 pm, he may be picked up by police. The
person must explain why they are there, and if
they cannot, they will be charged with ‘rogue
and vagabond’ and if proved guilty, must pay a
fine (C and K, 27 July 2009, see Guide, below).
5 Local government Town Assemblies have not
been elected since 2005 and have no legal
standing but they still run informally as the
Secretariats still exist.
6 Maternal mortality rates range from
807/100,000 to 1,120/100,000, depending on the
source. We are using 984/100,000, the number
given to us by a health professional in Rumphi
(A, 16 October 2009, see Guide, below). The
goal for MDG5 is 155/100,000 live births and is
unlikely to be met (Daily Times, 12 May 2010).
7 Reminiscent of the Banda regime when the
president’s remarks on radio were sufficient
to set new policy, President Mutharika, upon
returning from Cuba, said that he had called
upon the Ministry of Health and Gender to
never stop TBAs from practising. Instead,
they should devise a plan for training them.
His instruction was met by applause at the
press conference (Z, 4 October 2010, see
Guide, below).
8 We were told by the Blantyre District Health
Officer that there were 104 TBAs in the
district, and that 77 had so far been retrained
for their new roles (essentially, directing
women to go to health centres for delivery)
(M, 14 August 2009, see Guide, below).
9 The city has not had a dedicated ambulance
since 2002. The district health office has four
ambulances for the whole district, only one of
which serves the city (which includes Ndirande)
(M, 28 July 2009 and 14 August 2009, see
Guide, below).
10 ‘Guardians’ are female relatives of the
pregnant women who accompany them in
order to assist with the birth.
11 Mapinga is the belief that if one of the spouses
has extra-marital relations, the pregnancy will
be ‘tied’. Chiyenda mitala is the belief that a
polygamous husband can, by sleeping with
another wife, cause a ‘tied’ pregnancy.
Breaking of sticks and giving herbs during a
ritual ensures a ‘woman delivers immediately’,
but these treatments are forbidden within
hospitals. ‘This belief is strong and makes most
women go for TBAs or deliver on their own’ (N,
11 September 2009, see Guide, below).
12 We were told by a senior official in the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Security (C, 15 July
2010, see Guide, below) that it is not against
the law for TBAs to practise, which is why the
police do not enforce the ban.
13 Other institutions inhibiting collective action
and fostering ‘hedge clipping’ and the ‘tall
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poppy syndrome’ (where public pressure cuts
down innovators) include nsanje (jealousy) and
witchcraft beliefs. These create a sense of
insecurity that keeps people from asserting
their rights, aspiring or complaining about
malfeasants.
14 Ndirande market is slowly being reconstructed
and in the meantime it is poorly served with
water (there is one tap), toilets, cleaners, and
security. The market master (a city official)
needs a strong and representative committee
to ensure sanitation, health and safety
measures are enforced.
15 The market clerk at the city told our team:
the vendors ‘don’t have any committee that
belongs to politics, but a neutral one’. Then
the city’s security official corrected him, ‘the
city assembly is comfortable to work with
committees that are pro-ruling party. Let us
not beat around the bush, it’s important to
have committees that belong to the ruling
party since they are respected even here at
the assembly and they don’t bring unnecessary
problems at the market’ (W, 29 July 2009, see
Guide, below).
16 This goes hand in hand with the widespread
view that MPs represent their constituencies
and have little role in national development,
which is the President’s purview. MPs should
instead concentrate on providing private, club
and public goods to voters at home.
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Guide to field notes and interview citations
A = James Amani notes
C = Diana Cammack notes
K = Edge Kanyongolo notes
M = Basileke Mwamlima notes
N = Joel Nkhonya notes
W = Moir Walita Mkandawire notes
Z = Eveness Zuze notes
References
AfDevInfo (n.d.) Kamuzu Banda,
www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/peo/
peo_8762.html (accessed 1 November 2010)
Cammack, D. (2000) ‘At the Crossroads:
Freedom of Expression in Malawi’, The Final
Report of the 1999 ARTICLE 19 Malawi Election
Media Monitoring Project, March
Easterly, W.; Ritzen, J. and Woolcock, M. (2006)
‘Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth’,
Economics and Politics 18.2: 103–20
Woolcock, M. and Narayan, D. (2000) ‘Social
Capital: Implications for Development
Theory, Research, and Policy’, World Bank
Research Observer 15.2: 225–49
